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ABSTRACT 
The United States (U.S.) Army’s mission is to protect our nation and fight its 
wars; a mission that requires a substantial resource commitment.  The Army today consist 
of over 505,000 soldiers (more than any other U.S. military service), with over 81,000 of 
those soldiers comprising the Officer Corps.  This thesis develops a linear program to 
help manage the Army Competitive Category (ACC), a subset of the officer corps 
consisting of over 51,000 soldiers.  The Total Army Competitive Category Optimization 
Model (TACCOM) prescribes annual accessions and above zone, primary zone, and 
below zone promotion rates for all grades from Lieutenant to Colonel over a forty-year 
horizon.  We demonstrate TACCOM using data from fiscal year (FY) 2006 and 
requirement information for all officers in the ACC and also for the subset of officers just 
in the Aviation (AV) branch.  We find a deficit at the grade of Major (MAJ) will continue 
to exist through FY 2021 if current policy is not changed.  Our analysis on just the AV 
branch shows their mid-grade officer shortage can be remedied by either increasing 
training capacity by two-thirds, or reducing the attrition of Captains who have five years 
time in grade.  Our analysis also shows the current ACC accessions plan and promotion 
policies remedy the shortages at the grade of MAJ for the next seven consecutive years, 
but that there are future shortages ahead.  Using TACCOM, we find that one way to 
reduce the magnitude of the future shortfalls is to adjust the current promotion policy by 
increasing the number of early promotions to MAJ.  By accelerating the promotion to 
MAJ in the ACC the Army is only facing a shortage of MAJs for four consecutive years, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States (U.S.) Army’s mission is to protect our nation and fight its 
wars; a mission that requires a substantial resource commitment.  The Army today consist 
of over 505,000 soldiers (more than any other U.S. military service), with over 81,000 of 
those soldiers comprising the Officer Corps.  This thesis develops a linear programming 
model to help manage the Army Competitive Category (ACC), a subset of the officer 
corps consisting of over 51,000 soldiers.  Our model, the Total Army Competitive 
Category Optimization Model (TACCOM), prescribes annual accessions and above zone, 
primary zone, and below zone promotion rates for all grades from Lieutenant (LT) to 
Colonel over a forty year horizon.  We use TACCOM and data provided by the Army to 
analyze two scenarios. 
Our first scenario looks at the ACC inventory and requirements under current 
Army promotion policy.  Based on the current policy, TACCOM proposes annual LT 
accession and promotions at all grades to meet future requirements at all grades, but we 
focus our analysis on a pending deficit at the grade of MAJ.  We also look at the effect of 
accelerating promotion to Major (MAJ) by one year on the inventory. 
Our second scenario focuses on the Aviation (AV) Officer inventory.  TACCOM 
proposes AV LT accession and promotions at all grades to meet future Army 
requirements, again with a focus on future deficits at the grade of MAJ.  We also examine 
at the benefit of accelerating promotion to MAJ by one year, and other policy changes.   
For the ACC scenario, we find the Army’s current accession plan (“current plan”) 
over the next five years similar to what TACCOM proposes.  However, under the current 
plan, the Army will not satisfy its yearly requirements at the grade of MAJ for the next 
five years (FY 2008 - FY 2012), and for five years in the future (FY 2013 – FY 2018).  
TACCOM does better:  its prescriptions provide a fill rate of 87.14% at the grade of MAJ 
in FY 2007 (0.74% better than the current plan); a 85.24% fill rate in FY 2008 (again, 
0.74% better than the current plan); a 90.22% fill rate in FY 2009 (better than the current 
plan but exact data is not available for comparison); and 100% fill rate by FY 2010 
 xviii
(again, better than the current plan but exact data is not available for comparison).  
Additionally, with TACCOM prescriptions, the Army is only facing a shortage of MAJs 
for four consecutive years, from FY 2013 through FY 2017, versus the seven year 
shortage.   
TACCOM analysis for the AV branch scenario indicates the current AV branch 
accession plan should be reviewed as it will take and enormous training effort in FY 2009 
and FY 2010 to meet the future requirements at the grade of MAJ.  Because it is most 
likely not feasible to ramp up the training effort to a capacity required to meet the AV 
manning requirements, we propose that the AV branch focuses its efforts on reducing its 
attrition at the grade of Captain with five years time in grade (TIG) by 50%.  With these 
efforts the future fill rate at the grade of MAJ only goes as low as 86.46%.  This is 
significantly better than the current plan, where the inventory of AV MAJs is below the 
critical threshold of 85% fill rate starting in FY2015 and stays below for all future years.  
The ability to compare policies is also insightful, and with the TACCOM we notice that it 
may be possible to become more selective in the Army’s promotion system, at least in the 
AV branch. 
Our analysis shows that retaining officers (at least for the AV branch) is a key aid 
to filling future officer requirements.  At the current operational pace and constant Army 
transformation, it is imperative the appropriate actions are taken to minimize the future 
mid-grade officer gap. 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The United States (U.S.) Army’s mission is to protect our nation and fight its 
wars; a mission that requires a substantial resource commitment.  The Army today consist 
of over 505,000 soldiers (more than any other U.S. military service), with over 81,000 of 
those soldiers comprising the Officer Corps.  The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations (Army G-3) develops the force structure requirements for the U.S. Army that 
prescribes the personnel required to effectively operate the Army organization [U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2006].  The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Personnel (Army G-1) manages the personnel inventory to fill the force structure. 
Since the start of the Global War on Terror, the Army has continuously conducted 
major combat operations, while at the same time attempting to transform itself into a 
future force.  The Army G-3 has developed a force structure that the Army G-1 cannot 
man with the current officer inventory, and it will take years before the officer inventory 
is sufficient, because (unlike the private-sector where middle managers are hired and 
fired based on the needs of the organization) the Army must grow its leaders starting at 
initial entry. 
This thesis develops a linear program to help manage the Army Competitive 
Category (ACC), a subset of the officer corps consisting of over 51,000 soldiers.  The 
Total Army Competitive Category Optimization Model (TACCOM) prescribes annual 
accessions and above zone (AZ), primary zone (PZ), and below zone (BZ) promotion 
rates for all grades from Lieutenant (LT) to Colonel (COL) over a forty year horizon. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The American soldier remains the Army’s primary focus, the centerpiece of all 
that we do as an Army. Throughout the Army’s history, soldiers have answered the call 
to end tyranny, to free the oppressed and to light the path to democracy for struggling 
nations [U.S. Army, 2005b]. In order to have an effective fighting force, a nation must 
have a sufficient number of competent and capable leaders.   
2 
The Army currently consists of 81,579 officers divided into two separate 
categories [Haight, 2006].  The largest of these categories is the ACC which consists of 
all Army branches and career fields except specialty branches (such as the Medical 
Service Corps, the Veterinary Corps, Chaplains Corps, etc.).  The Army also divides its 
total inventory of personnel, known as its military account, into three components; (a) the 
operational force that is available for missions, (b) the institutional force that is available 
to support the operational force in a training capacity and higher headquarters, and (c) the 
Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) that are not available to fill the 
operational force due to training, permanent change in station, or who are in retirement 
status.  Due to the size of the Army’s military account, forecasting and monitoring its 
personnel is an important aspect of force structure planning and execution. The personnel 
proponent within the Army is the Army G-1.  Different organizations within the Army G-
1 contribute to personnel management such as, the Military Strength Analysis and 
Forecasting Division (DAPE-PRS) who monitors and forecasts the personnel inventory. 
The DAPE-PRS conducts officer forecasting based on the Personnel Manning 
Authorization Document (PMAD).  The force structure established by the Army G-3 
facilitates the PMAD.  The DAPE-PRS forecasts its manning requirements over a seven 
year time horizon based on budgetary constraints from the Offices of the Secretary of 
Defense.  The Army G-3 determines the size of the force based on the Army Chief of 
Staff’s guidance.  Once the force structure has the Army Chief of Staff’s approval, the 
Army G-1 develops the appropriate manning structure [Haight, 2006].  DAPE-PRS 
currently uses decision aids implemented in a spreadsheet and provides forecasts of 
officer inventory over an 84 month time horizon [U.S. Army, 2006]. 
The Army maintains a standard career progression for its officer corps.  All 
officers in the ACC start as 2nd Lieutenants (2LT) (which is accessions) and are 
promoted based on time in grade and performance through the rank of COL.  The Army 
manages its officers by Year Group (YG), or cohort.  A YG is a group of officers who are 
commissioned within a specific fiscal year (e.g., officers commissioned in FY 1997 are 




pyramid fashion.  The intent is to have enough senior leaders to lead the operational force 
from each YG over a military career, with “career” defined as being between 30 to 40 
years. 
Since 2002, the Army has been transforming itself from a division centric force to 
a modular force; placing new demands on the officer force that current projections show 
will not be satisfied until 2013.  The Army transformation has caused the basic structure 
of the Army to be mid-grade officer intensive.  With the Army’s continued involvement 
in the “War on Terror,” and the size of the force required in the current global 
environment, the Army’s shortages will continue for at least the next six years if the 
Army continues at the current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) [Henning, 2006].  
Unfortunately, due to the lean accessions from FY 1995 through FY 1999; for fiscal year 
(FY) 2007 the Army projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000, with the most acute 
shortfalls in senior Captains (CPT) (i.e. those with time in grade (TIG) greater than five 
years) and Majors (MAJ) with 11 to 17 years of experience.  The Army considers any 
personnel “fill rate” (the number of officers available to fill requirements) of less than 
85% per year, a “critical” shortage, and projects a fill rate of only  82.6% for MAJs in the 
ACC in FY 2007.  Figure 1 illustrates the current state of the Army’s ACC as of 
November 2006.  The Army actually started to fall short of personnel in September 2006. 











THE ACC OFFICER GAP 
 
 
Figure 1.   Army Strength Analysis Forecast. 
 
Figure 1 shows the Army Strength analysis forecast.  The numbers 
along the Y-axis represent the number of ACC officers in the 
inventory.  The X-axis represents the month and year.  The black 
line with boxes on the chart shows the force structure requirements 
consisting of authorized personnel plus TTHS from October 2006 
to August 2010.  The smooth red line decreasing starting in 
October 2008 illustrates the effects on the inventory if the Army is 
reduced to an end-strength of 482,400.  The blue area represents 
the historical strength while the green area represents the 
forecasted strength through FY 2010.  Where the green area does 
not meet the black line there is an officer deficit. (After Lukens 
[2006]). 
 
To combat the mid-grade officer shortage, the Officer Retention Division within 
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5 
targeted officers.  Additionally, the Army G-1 is re-evaluating current eligibility 
requirements for promotion to the mid-grade ranks.  TACCOM can help the Army 
quickly investigate the long-term consequences of today’s policy decisions as they look 
for the best way to grow the officer corps. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis develops a linear program to help manage the ACC, a subset of the 
officer corps consisting of over 51,000 soldiers.  The TACCOM prescribes annual 
accessions and AZ, PZ, and BZ promotion rates for all grades from LT to COL over a 
forty year horizon.  Chapter II describes how the Army officer inventory is managed 
using the current Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS).  Chapter III presents 
TACCOM.  In Chapter IV, we explore the future officer requirements, and look at how 
different policy decisions can affect the officer inventory.  Chapter V provides 
conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
 
6 
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II. OFFICER MANAGEMENT 
This chapter describes the management of the ACC officer inventory under the 
Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS).  It reviews OPMS history, Army 
personnel management tools and goals, current DAPE-PRS spreadsheet models and 
concludes with a review of related work and literature. 
A. HISTORY OF OPMS 
The Army uses OPMS to manage its inventory of officers.  This system has 
undergone several changes since 1970.  From 1970 to 1997, the system was primarily a 
Dual-Track system because it allowed an officer to choose to receive additional 
qualifications in a specialty function; for advancement purposes, OPMS placed a higher 
emphasis on success in senior command positions.  This system stood the test of time for 
over two decades, but the Army lost many highly qualified officers in specialty functions 
because of a lack of command opportunities [Lukens, 2006].  OPMS today hopes to give 
all officers a broad experience, and make the Army’s future leaders better strategic 
thinkers.  Additionally, OPMS assists with the retention of the best officers by giving 
them more opportunities for advanced civilian education and positions outside of their 
basic branches [Gillen, 2006]. 
OPMS XXI replaced the dual-track system in 1997.  The dual-track version of the 
officer corps historically aligned officers into three categories; (a) Combat Arms, (b) 
Combat Support, and (c) Combat Service Support.  These categories were replaced in 
1997 with OPMS XXI; (a) the Operational Career Field, (b) Operational Support, (c) 
Institutional Support, and (d) Institutional Operations.  OPMS XXI allowed an officer to 
specialize and placed higher emphasis on an officer’s ability to do a specialized job, 
versus his ability to perform in senior level leadership roles.  This gave officers who 
chose to leave the operational force an opportunity for advance civilian schooling, and 
the unique opportunity to become an expert in a specific arena.  Additionally, this system 
broadened the command opportunities for those officers who aspired to senior leadership 
positions in the operational force.  The primary drawback to OPMS XXI was that the 
officers who chose to lead the operational force had very limited opportunities to do jobs 
8 
outside of their respective branches.  This type of limitation over time created a narrowly 
focused officer who, through no fault of his/her own, did not have enough broad 
experiences to become the strategic thinker needed to lead today’s force.  Thus, the Army 
evolved again [Knighton, 2006]. 
The OPMS Officer Corps re-aligned into three categories; (a) Maneuver, Fires, 
and Effects (MFE), (b) Operational Support, and (c) Force Sustainment.  The Operational 
Support and Force Sustainment categories are critical to supporting and maintaining the 
operational forces (MFE branches).  However, the MFE branches drive the initial 
accession requirements of the Army due to the high number of junior officers required to 
fill these branches.  Table 1 illustrates the MFE branches. [Gillen, 2006] 
 
Maneuver, Fires, and Effects 
     
Maneuver Fires   
ARMOR  FIELD ARTILLERY 
INFANTRY AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY
AVIATION    
     
Effects     
INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
PUBLIC AFFAIR OPERATIONS  
     
Maneuver Support Special Operations Forces 
ENGINEERS SPECIAL FORCES 
CHEMICAL CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS  
MILITARY POLICE    
Table 1.   The OPMS Functional Alignments. 
 
Table 1 shows the functionally aligned OPMS.  The Maneuver, 
Fires, and Effects Branches are what all other branches support.  
The Army aligned the career fields with the appropriate basic 




B. MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Although the Army forecasts its officer requirements over a seven year time 
horizon for budgetary reasons, the Army manages a typical officer’s career over 30 years; 
a small number of senior leaders are managed through 40 years of service.  The intent is 
to have enough senior leaders to lead the operational force from each YG over a military 
career.  The primary controls utilized to manage the officer corps are accessions and 
promotions. 
The law dictates the number of officers the Army may maintain on active duty 
and promote.  For example, the provisions established by the 1980 Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) establishes guidelines for Army officer 
promotions (Table 2) [U.S. Congress, 1981].  The promotion opportunity rate is equal to 
the number of officers selected for promotion from the three zones (below the Zone (BZ), 
primary zone (PZ), and above the zone (AZ)) divided by the number of officers eligible 
in the PZ. 
 
 
Table 2.   DOPMA and Army Minimum Promotion Rates.   
 
Table 2 shows the guidelines that the Army must adhere to based on 
the DOPMA policy (After Schirmer [2006]).   
 
1. Accessions 
The Army depends on Accessions Command to appropriately manage the training 
of officers.  It has three primary sources for its pool of officers, the United States Military 
Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York, the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
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(ROTC), and the Officer Candidate School (OCS), at Fort Benning, Georgia.  These three 
sources produce a constant stream of officers annually to the Army Officer Corps.  
USMA produces from 850 to 1,000 2LTs each year, OCS produces from 1,500 to 1,900 
new 2LTs, and ROTC produces over 2,200 new officers for the active force. [Lukens, 
2006] 
Officers normally leave the ACC through three avenues:  completion of service 
obligation; reaching retirement eligibility; or are released.  The officer loss rate at the 
middle management level causes the number of officers that the Army brings into the 
organization by accessions extremely important. 
2. Promotions 
Because the Army commissions all officers in the ACC as 2LT, it is vital that the 
Army manages its inventory at senior grades through promotions.  The Army plans on 
promoting every qualified 2LT to 1LT.  The Army may deviate from the DOPMA goals 
shown in Table 2 based on its requirements.  
The Army starts to conduct promotion boards for the rank of CPT and above with 
each rank having its own board.  All boards consist of a general officer as the president 
and seniors officers, at least one to two grades higher than the officers being considered, 
but none of the members can be lower than a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC).  The promotion 
boards meet annually and HRC publishes the board for respective FY on or about 
September.  The function of the boards are to review all eligible officers records and 
determine who is qualified to move the next grade, based on specific guidance from the 
Chief of Staff, Army [U.S. Army, 2005c].   
Promotion boards consider officers in three zones:  BZ, PZ, and AZ.  For 
example, an officer commissioned in FY 1997 or in YG 1997 are considered to be in the 
“primary zone” for promotion to CPT, MAJ, LTC, and COL in FY 2001, 2006, 2013, 
2018.  All officers in YG 1997 have their records reviewed one year prior to their PZ 
board, and a small number of officers who have performed exemplary are promoted BZ 
to MAJ, LTC, or COL, with these boards occurring in 2005, 2012, or 2017.  Also, there 
are a number of officers who are not selected for promotion to the next grade during their 
11 
PZ board, and these officers are considered for promotion over the next two years, which 
is known as AZ.  If they are not selected AZ, these officers may elect to be retained at 
their current grade until retirement eligibility [U.S. Army, 2005c]. 
The current operating environment has caused the Army to closely look at how it 
promotes its officers.  Due to the increased number of mid-grade officers required in the 
operational force and Army Transformation, the promotion opportunities afforded to 
Army Officers are the highest they have ever been.  It takes up to eight years to grow a 
mid-grade officer, so even with a dramatic increase in accessions; the current inventory 
issue will not be corrected in the near future.   
C. MANAGEMENT GOALS 
The PMAD sets structure for the Army, from this document the DAPE-PRS 
establishes a target number of officers for each grade by branch and category [U.S. 
Army, 2005a]. These targets represent the number of officers required by the Army to 
complete its mission. In practice, the officer inventory does not meet these targets 
exactly.  However, meeting these targets for field grade officers is necessary to comply 
with U.S. law.  The most stringent requirement is that the number of COLs cannot exceed 
its target.  For LTC, the requirement is slightly more relaxed; the combined number of 
LTCs and COLs cannot exceed the sum of their targets.  Likewise, the combined number 
of MAJs and LTCs cannot exceed the sum of their targets.  The Army calls this process 
of satisfying field grade and congressional mandates for field grade officers “target roll 
down” [Yamada, 2000]. 
D. TOOLS AND DECISIONS AIDS 
The Army G-1, DAPE-PRS ensures proper forecasts are done in order to fulfill 
the Army’s manning requirements.  The organization has developed a spreadsheet model 
to accomplish this task. 
DAPE-PRS updates their spreadsheet model monthly to forecast the inventory 
versus the requirement over the next 84 months.  This tool is critical, because it allows 
for quick analysis of multiple policy issues that decision makers must combat daily. The 
spreadsheet model took the place of two antiquated models Budget Allocation Resource 
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of Notional (BARON) Force and the Competitive Category Army Tracking System 
(CCATS).  These two models were virtually the same, but were unable to address the 
critical issues with the management of the total Officer Corps [Haight, 2006].  Neither 
BARON nor CCATS provided management control decisions such as setting accession 
and promotion rates that best met the inventory (or strength) targets.  Neither 
incorporated OPMS XXI, which separates officers with a rank of MAJ or higher into four 
career fields.  Neither BARON nor CCATS accounted for end effects due to having too 
short a planning horizon [Yamada, 2002].  BARON and CCATS did not allow for quick 
analysis. 
The TACCOM allows the DAPE-PRS to conduct analysis on the future officer 
corps by looking at the time in grade (TIG).  The current model focuses on the aggregate 
inventory by grade and branch, but lends no insight on when is the pivotal TIG during an 
officer’s career (with “pivotal” defined as the TIG when officers are deciding to leave the 
Army). 
E. RELATED WORK 
The operations research literature contains a rich variety of papers answering a 
myriad of manpower issues.  The following are examples of literature which focuses on 
Army specific manpower issues. 
Holz and Wroth [1980] developed a linear program called the Enlisted Loss 
Inventory Model (ELIM), in order to assist the Army drawdown its personnel end 
strength after the Vietnam conflict.  The ELIM in conjunction with the Computation of 
Manpower Programs Using Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP) was first used in FY 
1972.  Over the 1970s and through the 1980s ELIM-COMPLIP enabled senior leaders in 
DoD to accurately forecast the impact of major policy decisions on the Army’s 
manpower.  ELIM-COMPLIP looked at the Army’s monthly inventory and forecast on a 
seven year time horizon.  One example of the ELIM-COMPLIP’s utility, was in 1974 
when the “Army had 13 combat divisions, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that a 16-
division Army was needed to meet national defense commitments.”  During this period, 
the U.S. Senate had recently passed a reduction of support troops in the European theater.  
Since standing-up three additional combat divisions meant adding over 16,000 soldiers to 
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the operational Army, the ELIM-COMPLIP projected that although the operating 
strength of the Army would increase by almost 40,000 soldiers the Army could remain at 
785,000.  The ELIM-COMPLIP gave insights on proposals for length of enlistments, 
retention policies, and budgetary decisions. [Holz and Wroth, 1980] 
Durso and Donahue [1995] developed the Total Army Personnel Lifecycle Model 
(TAPLIM) in 1991 in response to the Defense Authorization Act, requiring the military 
services to dramatically reduce manpower.  The TAPLIM remained a primary tool in the 
Army G-1 through the 1990s.  TAPLIM primarily assisted Army decision makers to 
combat the rapid drawdown after Desert Storm.  The linear program that Durso and 
Donahue developed has weights on the inventory accessions, losses, and promotions with 
the intent to minimize the operating strength deviation.  The weights translated to the cost 
to the Army for various decisions in a given year.  The insights from their model allowed 
the Army to determine how many soldiers it needed to access, promote, or release on a 15 
year time horizon. [Durso and Donahue, 1995]  
Gass et al [1988] developed The Army Manpower Long-Range Planning System 
(MLPRS).  This tool provided the Army with the analytical capability to project the 
strength of the active force out twenty years.  The MLPRS development stage began in 
1982.  Over a three year period it was moved to the Army’s primary computers, and by 
1987 the Army utilized the MLPRS to project strength of the Army over a 20 year 
horizon at skill, years-of-service, and grade level of detail.  The Army utilized this system 
into the early 1990s.  The MLPRS is not just one model but is divided into three 
subsystems:  The Data Processing Subsystem; The Flow Model Subsystem; and The 
Linear Program.  Gass’s MLPRS gave insight on the impact of competing goals on the 
Army Force structure [Gass et al, 1988]. 
Corbett [1995] developed a multi-year linear program designed to maximize the 
Army’s ability to meet forecasted requirements.  His model looked across all branches to 
determine how many junior officers are needed to not only fill the LT ranks, but also how 
many initial entry combat arms officers would it require to ensure there are enough mid-
grade officers available to transition to the non-combat arms branches later in their  
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career.  Corbett focused on techniques from goal programming to give insights to the 
Army’s accessions problem.  In our literature research, we cannot find any evidence of 
the model that Corbett developed was ever used.  
More recently Yamada [2000] looked at the ACC of the OPMS XXI.  He focused 
his efforts on developing an Infinite Time Horizon Manpower Planning model.  Unlike 
the other models in this literature review, where there is normally a finite time horizon or 
particular goal to meet, Yamada’s model allows for the uncertainty of military manpower 
planning, and looks out over an infinite time horizon.  His linear program gave insights to 
decision maker on the management of the ACC.  Yamada used OPMS XXI to constrain 
his model and allow for appropriate analysis [Yamada, 2000].  In our literature research, 
we cannot find any evidence of the model that Yamada developed was ever used. 
Shrimpton and Newman [2005] developed a network optimization model to assist 
the Army in designating its officers into career fields under OPMS XXI.  They created a 
model that could easily run on a windows based computer system.  The model allowed 
the Army G-1 to determine the number of officers the Army required per career field, and 
created an upper and lower bound for career field designations boards to consider when 
assigning officers.  The model developed by Shrimpton and Newman was used four times 
since 2001, assigning over 10,500 officers to career fields. 
These are but a few examples of how linear programming has enabled analyst to 
answer difficult personnel issues.  The decision makers are constantly concern if the 
personnel strength is adequate to fill current and future requirements.  
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III. MANPOWER PLANNING MODEL 
A.  ASSUMPTIONS  
The following are the Total Army Competitive Category Model (TACCOM) 
assumptions. 
1. The promotion rates are set by DOPMA. 
2. The inventory for a year is the officer inventory on September 30th of the 
year.  The model looks annually at the inventory based on time in grade. 
3. To allow more flexibility, the TACCOM’s PZ, AZ, BZ, Roll down, and 
accession constraints are elastic.  An elastic constraint can be violated at a 
cost per unit violation [Brown, Dell, and Newman, 2004].  We show 
elastic constraints by 
o≤ . 
 Figure 2 illustrates the flow of officers through the Army career progression in 
terms of a network.  Officers are first accessed through their source of commission, and 
then move through the network by grade and time in grade.  Officers move from one 
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Figure 2.   Officer Career Path Shown through a Network. 
 
Figure 2 shows the officer career path as a network.  Each node 
represents a grade at a given time in grade (for example the node 
labeled (4, 1) represents officers who have been MAJs for one year) 
inside the nodes).  The LT includes 2LTs and 1LTs.  Officers are 
only eligible for promotions during certain periods for a given grade 
during their career.  The green arrows at the top left of each node 
represent gains into a node, and the red arrows at the bottom left of 
each node represent losses.  The blue arrows represent promotion 




B. PROBLEM FORMULATION  
Indices  
y year of planning horizon, y = 1, 2, 3, . . . 
g grade, g = LT, CPT, MAJ, LTC, COL, BG 
t years of service based on time in grade 
b Branch, BR = IN, AR, AV….. 
(g,t,b) valid combinations of grade g, time in grade t, and branch b, e.g. 
(CPT,6,AV),(MAJ,6,AV), (LTC,5,AV), (COL,5,AV). 
Data 
,g yα  discount factor in grade g , for year y, ,0 <  < 1g yα  
,
bb
yyacc acc  minimum and maximum number of lieutenants to access in year y 
for branch b byacc  and 
b
yacc  may be the same. 
Reqg,y total number of officers required to meet the Army needs at grade 
g during year y  
tgty g,b targeted number of officers in grade g in branch b at the end of 
year y 
lry g,t,b proportion of officers in grade g, time in grade t in branch b who 
leave during year y 
TIGg time in grade based on grade g 
, ggpzp pzp  minimum and maximum promotion opportunity rate for promotion 
to grade g 
, ggbzp bzp  minimum and maximum proportion of officers who are promoted 
from the below zone to grade g 
, ggazp azp  minimum and maximum proportion of officers who can be 
promoted from the above zone to grade g 
bg yg,t,b the number of brigadier generals selected in year y, from the grade 








Nonnegative Variables: (Decision Variables) 
Xyg,t,b number of officers at grade g, time in grade t at the end of year y in 
branch b. To simplify the inventory balance constraints, , ,0
g t b
yX =  
represents an initial number of officers in grade g.  
,g yDev   the difference between what the Army needs at a particular grade g 
during year y versus what is available.  
, , ,y g t bPZ   number of officers promoted from the primary zone to grade g and 
with time in grade t in branch b during year y 
, , ,y g t bBZ   number of officers promoted from the below zone to grade g and 
with time in grade t in branch b during year y 
, , ,y g t bAZ   number of officers promoted from the above zone to grade g and 
with time in grade t in branch b during year y 
b
yA   number of lieutenants accessed into the Army during year y in a 
given branch b 
1. Objective Function  
 , ,Minimize g y g y
y g
Dev Elastic Penaltiesα +∑∑  (3.1) 
Subject to: 
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3. Primary Zone Promotion Constraints 
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4. Below the Zone Promotion Constraints 
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5. Above the Zone Promotion Constraints 
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6. Roll Down Constraints 
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7. Accessions Constraints 
                        ,
bb b
yy yacc A acc b y≤ ≤ ∀  (3.7) 
8. Nonnegative Constraints 
 , , , , , , , , ,, , , , ,  0    , , ,y
g t b g t b g t b g t b b
y y y y g yX PZ BZ AZ A DEV g t y b≥ ∀  (3.8) 
C.  EXPLANATION OF THE MODEL 
1. The Objective Function 
The objective function (3.1) seeks the total minimum weighted deviation from the 
force structure requirements over the planning horizon.  The discount factor ensures there 
is a higher priority on meeting the near-term requirements versus future ones.  The model 
also places heavy penalties for not meeting the roll down constraints (3.6) and for 
accessing more officers than a particular Officer Basic School can support in constraint 
(3.7).  
2. Constraints 
The constraints in (3.2) maintain the inventory of the officer corps in a given year 
for a given grade.  Constraints (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) ensures the proper portion of officers 
are promoted in the PZ, BZ, and AZ based on the promotion rates dictated by DOPMA 
and the needs of the Army.  The rolls down constraints (3.6) are set by law to maintain a 
proper portion of senior leadership proportional to the total strength of the Army.  The 
accession constraints (3.7) brings the maximum number of LTs to meet future 
requirements based on loss rates at a given time in grade, and promotion opportunities at 
future grades. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We implement TACCOM using a 3.72 GHz windows based personal computer 
running the General Algebraic Modeling System [(GAMS 2003)] and CPLEX 10.0.1 
solver.  The sections below describe data provided by DAPE-PRS, and analysis of 
personnel issues posed by DAPE-PRS. 
A. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Assumptions 
The loss rate, for TACCOM purposes, is by grade and TIG.  DAPE-PRS assumes 
the loss rate (fraction of officers who leave the service) remains the same for the next 40 
years and so does TACCOM. 
The time horizon is out to 2047.  The cohort that is accessed in 2007 should enter 
the General Officer ranks and reach retirement eligibility within a forty year time 
horizon. 
The size of the Army stabilizes in 2013 and remains at that level through 2047. 
2. Data 
The following data, from the DAPE-PRS database as of November 2006, 
comprise the actual Army inventory data and the future requirements prescribed by the 
Army G-3 through the Office of the Secretary of Defense [Lewis, 2006]. 
a. Targets and Inventories 
Through a spreadsheet model, DAPE-PRS tracks the ACC inventory and 
projects future officer targets by grade for the next seven years.  See the Appendix, Table 
8 for the current ACC and the current Aviation (AV) inventory, Tables 9 and 10 for the 




The initial aggregate inventory by grade as of September 30, 2006 is what 
we use as the initial input data for the TACCOM.  As data in the Appendix shows, there 
are no expected shortfalls in ACC or AV branch for the initial year (2006), except in the 
grade of MAJ.  Table 3 shows the expected 2007 shortfall for MAJ. 
 
GRADE ACC   AV   
MAJ 10541 405 672 100 
 
Table 3.   The FY 2007 shortage at the grade of MAJ. 
 
Table 3 shows the FY 2007 shortage at the grade of MAJ.  The 
total inventory for MAJs in the ACC and AV branch in FY 2006 
are not sufficient to meet the requirements in FY 2007.  The ACC 
has a shortfall of 405 MAJs, while the AV branch has a shortage of 
100 MAJs. 
 
b. Parameters for Time in Grade 
The TIG data for the ACC and AV branch that TACCOM uses is 
displayed in the Appendix, Tables 11 and 12. 
c. Attrition Rates 
We calculate the attrition rate using a one year time horizon (30 
September 2005 through 30 September 2006).  Prior to FY 2005, the Army habitually 
implemented a Stop-Loss policy that directly affects the historical loss rates from FY 
2001-FY 2005.  This controversial policy allows the service to determine which critical 
units or military occupational specialties could not to be released from active duty.  As an 
example of its impact, the historical attrition rate of company grade officers is 7% over 
the past 20 years, but the attrition rate for company grade officers was less than 5% from 
FY 2001 through FY 2004.  In FY 2005, the attrition rate increased to almost 9% when 
the Stop-Loss policy for deployed units was lifted (officers who were planning to leave 
12 months earlier left the service at the exact same time as other officers’ service 
commitment expired) [Lewis, 2006].  The attrition rates of officers within the ACC and 
the AV branch from FY 2005 to FY 2006 are displayed in the Appendix, Tables 13 and 
14. 
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d. Bounds for Promotion Rates 
The lower bounds on the promotion rates are from DOPMA.  During FY 
2006 the Army promoted over 98% of officers available for promotion to CPT, 95% of 
officers available for promotion to MAJ, and over 92% of officers available for 
promotion to LTC [Hoffman, 2006].  This trend should continue for the next few years, 
illustrating the flexibility in the range for promotion rates.  Table 4 displays these 
promotion rates, and the upper bounds for the AZ are based on current Army practices 
[Haight, 2006]. 
 
  PZ Rate BZ Rate AZ Rate 
  Lower   Upper Lower  Upper Lower   Upper 
CPT 95%   100% 0%  10% 0%  25% 
MAJ 80%  95% 0% 10% 0%  25% 
LTC 60%  95% 0% 10% 0%  25% 
COL 50%   60% 0%  10% 0%   25% 
 
Table 4.   The promotion opportunity rate provided by the Army and used by 
TACCOM. 
 
Table 4 shows the promotion opportunity rate provided by the Army 
and used by TACCOM.  For example the lower bound for promotion 
to MAJ in the PZ is 80%, but the Army can elect to promote up to 
95% of officers available for promotion to MAJ.  The Army can also 
elect to promote as many as 10% of an eligible officer population for 
promotion BZ to MAJ, and as many as 25% of officers to MAJ who 
in the AZ category 
3. Determining Weights 
To access its annual personnel cost for budget requirements, the Army G-1 
utilizes an annual cost for officers based on their pay grade.  The cost or annual 
investment for each officer includes base pay, medical benefits, and cost of living 
allowances.  This value is what TACCOM utilizes for the weights in the objective 
function.  Based on the highest grade combination in a constraint, TACCOM uses the 
highest pay grade value as the penalty when a promotion constraint is not met.  These 




Grade LT CPT MAJ LTC COL 
Value $86,516 $110,400 $138,107 $160,189 $189,181 
 
Table 5.   The annual investment the Army estimates per grade. 
 
Table 5 shows the annual investment the Army estimates per grade.  For 
example the Army makes an annual investment of $110,400 for each 
CPT (After, Lewis, 2006). 
B. SCENARIOS 
We look at two different scenarios.  The first scenario focuses on the ACC, while 
the second scenario looks closely at the AV branch.  For all scenarios, we limit our focus 
to accessions of officers, and focus on the point at which the inventory at the grade of 
MAJ reaches a steady-state, continuously meeting future requirements.  The grade of 
MAJ is critical due to the increased requirements at this grade in the future force 
structure.  We also look at what affect meeting the MAJ inventory requirements has on 
the CPT inventory.  The TACCOM is a dynamic model, changes in one grade affects 
other grades directly.  Such dynamics are currently not captured in the current 
spreadsheet model past an 84 month time horizon. 
The first scenario looks at the ACC inventory and requirements under the current 
promotion policy.  Based on what the Army plans to do, we propose what LT accessions 
and promotions at all grades are required to meet future requirements.  Also within this 
scenario, we look at the effect of a possible policy to accelerate promotion to MAJ by one 
year.  The resulting linear program has about 4,200 equations and 4,800 variables, and it 
takes only about 4.0 seconds to produce an optimal solution. 
The second scenario focuses on the AV Officer inventory in order to illustrate the 
utility of the TACCOM to aid in branch specific analysis.  Based on what the Army plans 
to do, we propose what AV LT accessions and promotions at all grades are required to 
meet future requirements.  Also within this scenario, we look at whether there is any 
benefit to a possible policy to accelerate promotion to MAJ by one year. The resulting 
linear program has the same number of equations and variables as in the first scenario, 
and also takes only about 4.0 seconds to produce an optimal solution. 
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In the second scenario, we adjust the promotion rates.  The concern is that the 
current operational environment does not lend itself to allow the Army to truly be 
selective in whom it promotes.  This scenario tightens the parameters of PZ promotion 
opportunities to the DOPMA minimum, and looks at its affect on what AV LT accessions 
are required to meet future requirements at the grade of MAJ in the AV branch.  
1. Army Competitive Category Scenario 
The first scenario assumes current operational conditions with the current 
promotion rates and attrition rates.  Figure 3 illustrates the current LT accessions and the 
TACCOM accession plan based on the current promotion rates and attrition rates for the 
ACC. 








































Figure 3.   TACCOM ACC Accession Plan. 
 
Figure 3 shows the TACCOM accession plan.  The Army currently 
plans to access 4,900 officers in FY 2007, 5,200 in FY 2008, and 
5,500 in FY 2011 and beyond as illustrated by the red bar chart.  
The TACCOM recommendation is very similar, allowing a slight 
reduction in FY 2008 and in FY 2012 , but under the Army’s 
accession plan the Army faces significant shortages at the grade of 
MAJ from FY 2013 through FY 2020. 
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Currently the total training capacity for the officer corps is 4,617 officers in FY 
2007, 4,523 in FY 2008, and possibly up to 6,000 officers by FY 2011 [Haight, 2006].  
We ran TACCOM with and without limiting the number officers accessed by these 
training limits.  The results shown in Figure 3 are without a training capacity constraint to 
maintain consistency with the current Army accession plan.  The accession plan that the 
TACCOM proposes for the ACC places an immediate strain on the agency required to 
access officers.  However, struggling to recruit and train an enormous number of officers 
now, facilitates the future officer corps not to have large gaps in coverage over its 
requirements.   
The DAPE-PRS use a spreadsheet model to forecast the Army officer inventory.  
Table 6 illustrates what the DAPE-PRS projects for shortfalls at the grade of MAJ. 
 
 
Table 6.   The DAPE-PRS officer inventory projected shortages as of November 
2006. 
 
Table 6 shows the DAPE-PRS officer inventory projected shortages as of 
November 2006. The chart shows the forecasted officer end strength at 
each grade for FY 2007 and FY 2008, and the operational strength 
deviation at each grade.  The numbers in parentheses represent shortages 
at that grade.  The % fill rate column represents the number of officers at 
that grade divided by the number of officers required at that grade (after 
Lukens, 2006) 
 
The TACCOM produces a better solution than the current plan (Figure 4).  The 
results from TACCOM suggests an increase in the grade of MAJ to a 87.14% fill rate in 
FY 2007 which is 0.74% better than the current plan, 85.24% fill rate in FY 2008 which 
is 0.74% better than the current plan, 90.22% fill rate in FY 2009 (better than the current 
plan but exact data is not available for comparison), and 100% fill rate by FY 2010  
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(again, better than the current plan but exact data is not available for comparison).  
Additionally, the Army’s current plan cannot meet officer requirements and grow the 
force within the next five years. 
 






























































Figure 4.   TACCOM Annual MAJ inventory prescription. 
 
Figure 4 shows TACCOM annual MAJ inventory prescription.  
TACCOM plan shows the Army can satisfy requirements at the 
grade of MAJ by FY 2021 based on current Army accession plans, 
promotion policy, and attrition rates, as illustrated by the blue line.  
The blue line shows the inventory of MAJs based on the TACCOM 
accession plan (Figure 3) and current promotion rates.  The red bar 
chart represents what the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
requires the Army to maintain at the grade of MAJ. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the Army does not fill its requirements at MAJ for seven 
consecutive years, from FY 2013 to FY 2020.  This phenomenon is associated with 
manpower decisions made prior to FY 2004. The TACCOM prescription starting in FY 
2007 provides an accession plan that produces an inventory of MAJs that satisfies all 
requirements by FY 2021. 
 




Figure 5 shows CPT requirements are met or exceeded throughout the whole time 
horizon after FY 2011.  The TACCOM recommended CPT inventory exceeds 
requirements after FY 2011 thus increasing the pool of eligible MAJs.  This is important 
because it is critical filling the MAJ grade does not create a CPT shortage in the future. 
 



















Figure 5.   TACCOM Annual ACC CPT Inventory based on current Army 
accession plan.  
 
Figure 5 shows TACCOM annual ACC CPT inventory based on current 
Army accession plan.  At the current promotion policy and attrition rate, 
the Army maintains at least the required number of CPTs from FY 2011 
and beyond. 
 
The DAPE-PRS is continuously looking at what effects different policies have on 
the officer inventory.  Due to the shortage of officers at the MAJ grade, the Army G-1 
has asked for analysis on the affect of accelerating the promotion to MAJ to six years 
TIG for CPTs, which translate to officers pinning on the rank of MAJ at nine years.  
Figure 6 illustrates the results from the TACCOM.  It shows that if officers are promoted 
at the current promotion rate, but at the same time accelerate the time of the promotion to 
MAJ by one year, the Army could meet its requirements at the grade of MAJ in FY 2007.   
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However, shortfalls still exist in FY 2014 through FY 2016. The Army is only facing a 
shortage of MAJs for four consecutive years, from FY 2013 through FY 2017, versus the 
seven year shortage illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
TACCOM ACC Annual MAJ Inventory































































Figure 6.   TACCOM Annual MAJ Inventory based on accelerated promotion to 
MAJ.   
 
Figure 6 shows TACCOM annual MAJ inventory based on accelerated 
promotion to MAJ.  The Army can satisfy requirements at the grade of 
MAJ by FY 2018, as illustrated by the blue line.  The blue line shows 
the inventory of MAJs based on the TACCOM accession plan in Figure 
3 and current promotion rates and an accelerated promotion to the grade 
of MAJ.  The red bar chart represents what the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense requires the Army to maintain at the grade of MAJ.  By 
accelerating the promotion to MAJ, the Army is only facing a shortage 
of MAJs for four consecutive years, from FY 2013 through FY 2017, 
versus the seven year shortage illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Looking at just the ACC, we see that with minor policy adjustments the Army can 
immediately fix it shortfall at the grade of MAJ.  Accelerating promotions to MAJ does 




looking at just the ACC may not illustrate the real issues within the Army Officer Corps.  
We now focus our efforts on the AV branch to see what affects manpower policy has on 
the Army’s AV branch officer inventory. 
2. Aviation Branch Scenario 
The second scenario focuses on the manpower concerns within the AV branch.  
As the Army transforms itself, so do the individual branches.  The AV branch requires 
more training time for new LTs than any other branch.  The officers commissioned in the 
AV branch incur an active duty service obligation of six years, which does not begin until 
the officer completes flight training.  Flight training can last from 12 to 24 months, 
depending on multiple factors such as the type of airframe the officer is designated to fly 
and to the time of year the officer begins the actual flying portion of his training.  The 
flight training with the addition of the active duty service obligation normally causes the 
AV branch to have a large exodus when the officer reaches the grade of CPT with five 
years TIG.  This is illustrated in Table 14 in the Appendix, which shows that the AV 
branch losses 50% of the officers in the grade of CPT with five years TIG.  This attrition 
rate is a driving factor on how many officers the AV branch should access in order to 
meet its future requirements.  The transformation of the AV branch, like the other MFE 
branches require more MAJs than it did under its previous structure.   
a. TACCOM Limited to Current Accession Plan 
Figure 7 illustrates the current AV accessions plan, and the TACCOM 
recommendations.  They match exactly when TACCOM is restricted to access no more 
than the AV accession plan. 
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Figure 7.   The Current AV Branch Officers’ Accession Plan.  
 
Figure 7 shows the current AV branch officers’ accession plan. The 
magenta bars represent the current plan.  The blue line provides a 
TACCOM officer accessions plan. 
 
Figure 8 shows that the AV branch achieves its requirements for MAJ 
from FY 2009 to FY 2012, but fails to meet its requirements after FY 2013.  For this 
scenario, we assume the current attrition rate for the AV branch shown in the Appendix, 
Table 14. 
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Figure 8.   The Future Annual AV MAJ Officer Inventory Given Current Army 
Policy.   
 
Figure 8 shows the future annual AV MAJ officer inventory given current 
Army policy.  The dark red dotted line represents the requirements for the 
grade of MAJ.  The blue line with diamonds represents the AV MAJ Officer 
inventory based on the TACCOM accession plan from Figure 7.  This 
Figure shows that the future AV branch inventory is not sufficient to meet 
the requirements. 
 
Not only does the AV branch current accession plan degrade the 
possibility for the branch to meet its MAJ requirements, but in Figure 9 we notice the 





Fill rate 85% 
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Figure 9.   The Future Annual AV CPT Officer Inventory Given Current  Army 
Policy.   
 
Figure 9 shows the future annual AV CPT officer inventory given current 
Army policy. The dark red dotted line represents the requirements for the 
grade of CPT.  The blue line represents diamonds the TACCOM 
prescription AV CPT Officer inventory.  There is a steady decline in the 
AV branch CPT inventory for three consecutive years before any 
noticeable increase; however, at no time in the future does the AV branch 
have enough CPTs to fulfill its requirements based on the current accession 
plan from Figure 7. 
 
Under the AV branch’s current accession plan, the MAJ fill rate is at 
100% for four consecutive years starting in FY 2009 (Figure 8).  However, the fill rate at 
CPT continues to decrease.  The critical future issue, the fill rate at MAJ decreases below 
85% starting in FY 2014 and continues to remain well below the Army’s benchmark 
through FY 2047. 
b. TACCOM with Unconstrained Accessions 
We provide two possible alternatives to combat the AV branch’s future 
mid-grade officer issues, and use the TACCOM to gain insights on a variety of possible 
outcomes.  The first removes the cap on LT accessions, and the second reduces by half 
the attrition of CPTs with five years TIG.   
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Figure 10.   TACCOM AV Accession Plan when no Limit on the Number of 
Accessions.   
 
Figure 10 shows TACCOM AV accession plan when no limit on the 
number of accessions.  The AV branch currently plan to access 270 officers in FY 2007, 
270 in FY 2008, and 300 in FY 2009 and beyond as illustrated by the red bar chart.  The 
TACCOM proposes that the training center at Fort Rucker, Alabama would need to 
increase it training capacity 150% in FY 2009 and more than 110% in FY 2010.  
Unfortunately, even if Fort Rucker could increase its training capacity, it still would not 
completely fix the future shortages at the grade of MAJ (Figure 11).   In addition, our 
infrastructure and personnel increases required for this temporary increase will not be 
needed in FY 2011.  The decrease starting in FY 2013 through FY 2018 is attributed to 
the manpower decisions made prior to FY 2006.   
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Figure 11.   TACCOM Annual AV MAJ inventory when no Limit on the Number 
of Accessions.   
 
Figure 11 shows TACCOM annual AV MAJ inventory with no Limit on 
the Number of Accessions.  At the current promotion policy and attrition 
rate the AV branch reaches a steady state at the grade of MAJ by FY 2021, 
as illustrated by the blue line which represents the inventory of MAJs based 
on the current accession plan and promotion rates.  The red bar chart 
represents what the Office of the Secretary of Defense requires the Army to 
maintain at the grade of MAJ.  Although the AV branch plan allows the 
branch to meet its officer requirements by FY 2009, the branch goes eight 
consecutive years, from FY 2013 to FY 2020, without enough MAJs to 
meet its requirements.  This shortage is a direct result of accessing too few 
officers in past years, and not working diligently to retain enough officers 
to meet future requirements. 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the AV branch’s CPT inventory is at the critical fill point for 
three consecutive years before FY 2011 where the AV branch continuously has a surplus 
of CPT.  The large increase in the grade of CPT inventory from FY 2012 to FY 2018 is 
needed to satisfy future requirements at MAJ.  
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Figure 12.   TACCOM Annual AV CPT Inventory.   
 
Figure 12 shows TACCOM annual AV CPT inventory.  At the 
current rate, the AV branch maintains at least the required amount of 
CPTs from FY 2011 and beyond.  The additional CPTs from FY 2012 
to FY 2018 are needed to satisfy future requirements at MAJ. 
c. TACCOM with Unconstrained Accessions and Adjusted CPT 
Attrition Rate 
To maintain enough AV officers to meet future requirements, the branch 
must focus its efforts on retention.  If the AV branch can retain 75% of the officers when 
they reach the critical TIG of five years, the difference in training requirements 
(accessions) are displayed in Figure 13.  These accessions are significantly less than those 
when retention is only 50% (Figure 10).  At no time does the MAJ inventory reach a 
critical fill rate status (Figure 14).  The lowest point is in FY 2008 when it reaches as low 
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Figure 13.   TACCOM AV Accession Plan with no Limit on Number of Accessions 
and a 25% Attrition at CPT with Five Years TIG.   
 
Figure 13 shows TACCOM AV accession plan with no limit on number 
of accessions and a 25% attrition at CPT with five years TIG. The 
TACCOM proposes that the AV branch must surge its training capacity 
by 112 officers or adjust its training seat allocations in FY 2009 in order 
to have enough aviators to fill future requirements.  This is significantly 
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Figure 14.   TACCOM Annual AV MAJ Inventory based on Reduction in 
Attrition at the Grade of CPT.   
 
Figure 14 shows TACCOM annual AV MAJ inventory based on 
reduction in attrition at the grade of CPT.  At no point in the future does 
the inventory drop below the Army benchmark of 85% fill rate.  This is 





Fill rate 86.46% 
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TACCOM Annual CPT Inventory
































































Figure 15.   TACCOM Annual AV CPT Inventory based on Reduction in 
Attrition at the grade of CPT.   
 
Figure 15 shows TACCOM annual AV CPT inventory based on 
reduction in attrition at the grade of CPT.  When the grade of CPT’s TIG 
attrition rate at five years is decreased to 25% the AV branch maintains 
at least the required amount of CPTs from FY 2011 and beyond.  During 
the five years it does not meet its requirements, the lowest fill rate is 
91.25%.  This is a better result than a lowest fill rate of 72.29% (Figure 
12).  
d. Policy Option Comparison 
The TACCOM lends insights to the implementation of various policy 
options.  With TACCOM we are able to adjust the upper and lower bounds on accessions 
and promotions.  We also can adjust attrition rates and select when officers are promoted 
in order to see the possible future outcomes based on senior leaders’ decisions today.  A 
few of the policies that are currently being considered are; (a) possibly moving the 
promotion to MAJ to one year earlier making the average total time in service of a new 
MAJ nine years (b) reverting back to the promotion rates in the 1980s that stayed at the 
lower end of the DOPMA allowable promotion opportunity rate.  To illustrate the utility 
of the TACCOM, we look at a comparison of these policies (Figure 16 and Table 7).  
 
Fill rate 91.25% 
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Figure 16.   TACCOM AV Branch Policy Option Comparison.   
 
Figure 16 shows TACCOM AV branch policy option comparisons, 
using the current attrition (Appendix, Table 14).  The dark red line 
with the squares represents the current requirements for the grade of 
MAJ in the AV branch through FY 2021.  The navy blue line with the 
diamonds represents the proposed solution when the promotion to the 
grade of MAJ is accelerated by one year.  The green line with the 
triangles represents the population at the grade of MAJ if the Army 
reverts to a more selective promotion system.  The light blue line with 
the crossed lines represents the inventory at the grade of MAJ based 
on the initial TACCOM proposal.  The magenta line with the star on 
it represents the current forecast for the grade of MAJ based on the 
current officer accession plan.  The pink diamond represents the MAJ 
population when the Army promotes to MAJ one year earlier and 
delay promotions to LTC to one year later.  This figure illustrates that 
although some policies may remedy the AV branch’s MAJ shortage 
as early as FY 2008, the officer accession decisions made in the past 
have a direct effect well into the future.  All of the policy options 
converge to their lowest point in FY 2017. (Note: all policy option 
outcomes shown are based on results from the TACCOM) 
 
 
Fill rate 64.82% 
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We notice that the AV branch MAJ inventory does not meet its 
requirements initially, even if the Army G-1 passes a policy that promotes officers to the 
grade of MAJ early.  However, this option keeps the grade of MAJ below the critical fill 
rate for three years, versus the four years on the current path, and five years if the Army 
reverts to a more selective promotion rate (see Table 7).   
 














Early to MAJ / 
Delay to LTC  
Promotion Option 
2007 93.79% 93.50% 97.37% 93.69% 93.52% 
2008 89.94% 89.57% 95.92% 89.13% 100.00% 
2009 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2010 100.00% 100.99% 100.14% 100.79% 101.52% 
2011 100.00% 100.00% 100.40% 100.00% 103.21% 
2012 100.00% 100.00% 96.16% 100.00% 100.00% 
2013 94.47% 95.02% 86.21% 92.57% 93.10% 
2014 83.89% 84.16% 77.07% 83.32% 82.88% 
2015 76.16% 75.09% 69.77% 74.55% 77.42% 
2016 72.08% 71.69% 65.14% 70.15% 69.98% 
2017 67.36% 66.79% 86.86% 64.82% 89.75% 
2018 67.75% 87.71% 94.29% 84.74% 96.01% 
2019 56.63% 91.08% 98.70% 88.50% 94.78% 
2020 62.37% 98.36% 100.00% 94.94% 98.92% 
2021 64.44% 100.00% 100.00% 96.69% 99.03% 
Table 7.   MAJ Fill Rate Percentages. 
 
Table 7 shows the MAJ fill rate percentage.  The six columns 
represent the MAJ fill rate percentages for the AV Branch based on 
present promotion rate policies (Table 4) and the current attrition 
rates (Table 14 in the Appendix).  The First column is FY 2007 to 
FY 2021, the second column is the current course, the third column 
is the TACCOM proposed fill rate, the fourth is if the policy 
changes to promote to MAJ one year earlier, the fifth column 
represents the AV MAJ fill rate if the Army reverts to a more select 
promotion policy, and the last column represents the AV MAJ fill 
rate if the Army promotes to the grade of MAJ one year earlier but 
delays the promotion to LTC by one year. (Note: all policy option 
outcomes shown are based on results from the TACCOM) 
 
Table 7 also illustrates the impact if the Army incorporates delaying 
promotions to LTC with the policy to accelerate promotions to MAJ.  The result is the 
AV branch has more than enough MAJs to fill its requirements starting in FY 2008 
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through FY 2013, and even when the fill rate is below the Army’s benchmark of 85% fill 
rate to MAJ, it is still 5.81% better than just accelerating promotions MAJ in FY 2014, 
7.65% better in FY 2015, and 4.84 % better in FY 2016.  This comparison shows there is 
benefit to revisiting this policy as a recommendation to mitigate future AV MAJ officer 
shortages.  Figures 17 and 18 also show the overall impact of this policy on the AV 
branch over a 40 year time horizon; we notice that although the problem at the grade of 
MAJ is immediately fixed for a few years, the officer inventory problem is actually 
shifted to the grade of CPT. 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 compare two policy options that are currently being 
considered by the Army G-1.  One option is to both accelerate the promotion to MAJ by 
one year, and delay the promotion to LTC by one year, making the grade of MAJ longer.  
Option two proposes that the AV branch increase its training capacity to 500 officers by 
FY 2011.  Figure 17 illustrates how the different policy decisions affect on the MAJ 
inventory.  We notice that the both alternatives do better than the current plan.  The best 
option for the AV branch is to increase its accession if wants to meet its MAJ 
requirements past FY 2013.  Figure 18 illustrates the increasing the accessions of officers 


































































Figure 17.   Promotion Policy Impacts on the AV MAJ Officer Inventory.   
 
Figure 17 shows the promotion policy impacts on the AV MAJ officer inventory.  
The dark red line dotted lone with a square represents the AV branch requirements.  
The blue line with a diamond represents the future inventory based on current 
promotion policy and attrition rates.  The red line with triangles represents the 
policy option of accelerating promotion to MAJ while at the same time delaying 
promotion to LTC.  The green line with a bold square represents the gradual 
increase of officer accessions into the AV branch to a steady-state of 500 officers 
by FY 2011.  This Figure illustrates that the one way for the AV branch to meet 
future requirements is to increase the number of officers it can train from the 
current plan of 300 officers to at least 500 officers, if it is to overcome the high 





















































Figure 18.   Promotion Policy Impacts on the AV CPT Officer Inventory.   
 
Figure 18 shows the promotion policy impacts on the AV CPT officer 
inventory.  The dark red dotted line with a square represents the AV branch 
requirements.  The blue line with a diamond represents the future inventory 
based on current promotion policy and attrition rates.  The red line with 
triangles represents the policy option of accelerating promotion to MAJ 
while at the same time delaying promotion to LTC.  The green line with a 
bold square represents the gradual increase of officer accessions into the 
AV branch to a steady-state of 500 officers by FY 2011.  This figure 
illustrates that for the AV branch to exceed its requirements at the grade of 
CPT, it would need to increase its accession to 500 officers per year.  
Promoting officers early to MAJ and delaying promotions to LTC in order 
to fill MAJ shortages actually degrades the future CPT inventory. 
C. SUMMARY 
The analysis in this chapter shows a direct relationship between the accession of 
officers and the Army’s ability to meet future requirements at higher grades.  The 
TACCOM allows for the insights of what happens if the AV branch does a better job at 
officer retention.  We then see the relationship between the attrition rate at future grades’ 
impact on future accessions. 
There are multiple avenues to take in correcting the Army’s manpower issues.  
When we look at the aggregate it seems that the manpower problem corrects itself over 
time.  However, as the case with the AV branch shows, Army aggregate solutions can 
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cover up significant problems at the branch level of detail.  When we look specifically at 
the AV branch it is clear the Army has only a couple of policy options available to 
correct future manpower shortages.  One way to correct the AV branch future manpower 
problem is the addition of resources to expand its training capability.  With increased 
accession by one-third in FY 2010 to 400, and to access 500 AV officer each year 
starting in FY 2011 and beyond.  Also the AV branch can work more diligently to lower 
its attrition rate at the critical TIG of five years for CPTs.  If these measures are taken 
soon, then future shortages at the mid-grade level are minimized. 
As our analysis shows, retaining officers (at least for the AV branch) is the best 
course of action for addressing future Army manning requirements.  At the current 
operational pace and constant transformation of the Army, it is imperative the appropriate 
actions are taken to minimize the future mid-grade officer gap. 
46 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research of military manpower alternatives is critical to maintaining a future 
fighting force.  The majority of military manpower decision making models or tools 
focus on looking at the total annual population of the inventory.  The TACCOM takes a 
different turn, and looks at the officers TIG coupled with the AZ, PZ, and BZ promotion 
rates to gain insights on possible future issues. 
We tested the TACCOM using two scenarios, and summarized our results with 
tables and figures illustrating the proposed TACCOM outcomes.  The first scenario 
involved looking at the ACC, focusing on the accession plan to meet the future 
requirements at the grade of MAJ.  Our second scenario illustrated that the TACCOM is 
not just a model that looks at the aggregate; it is also capable of focused analysis for the 
AV branch. 
In the ACC scenario, we notice that the current Army accession and the 
TACCOM plan are almost identical over the next five years.  However, when we look at 
the specific grade of MAJ we notice that the Army does not meet its requirements at the 
grade for at least ten years in the future.  In the AV branch scenario, we find the current 
AV branch accession plan should be reviewed.  It will take an enormous training effort in 
FY 2009 and FY 2010 to meet the future requirements at the grade of MAJ.  Because it 
may be difficult to ramp up the training effort to the capacity required to meet the AV 
branch manning requirements, we propose that the AV branch focuses its efforts on 
reducing its attrition at the grade of CPT with five years TIG by 50%.  These efforts 
greatly impact the accession numbers and the ability to meet future requirements at the 
grade of MAJ.  The ability to compare policies is also insightful and with the TACCOM 
we notice that it may be possible to become more selective in the Army’s promotion 
system, at least in the AV branch. 
There are two areas for future work that might improve the TACCOM as a 
manpower modeling tool.  TACCOM uses a finite time horizon to determine it optimal 
solution.  The future requirements of any military force are unknown.  A look at infinite 
time horizon techniques would aid in this unknown area.  The second area is to 
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implement the model with multiple branches to conduct analysis on the interactions 
between the various branches and their individual requirements.  Research that allows for 
this option would be very beneficial to the Army G-1 analyst. 
49 
APPENDIX.  TACCOM DATA 
This appendix contains tables of TACCOM data provided by DAPE-PRS. 
 
Grade ACC   AV 
LT 13518  341 
CPT 17962  1612
MAJ 10541  672 
LTC 6460  426 
COL 2384   171 
 
Table 8.   The initial ACC and AV branch officer inventory data. 
For example, there are 13,518 LTs in the ACC of which 341 
are in the AV branch. 
 
Grade 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
LT 9163 9586 9981 10377 10716 11076 11246 11292
CPT 15657 16176 16750 17032 17335 17624 17743 17742
MAJ 10507 10946 11345 11481 11613 11722 11751 11749
LTC 6578 6720 6803 6849 6897 6921 6930 6929
COL 2379 2401 2428 2407 2418 2422 2422 2422
 
Table 9.   The current ACC officer requirements as established by the PMAD.   
For example, the Army requires 16,176 CPTs in FY 2007 
and 6,720 LTCs in FY 2007. 
 
Grade 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
LT 483 471 475 473 473 474 474 474
CPT 1428 1411 1426 1400 1404 1407 1408 1411
MAJ 746 772 794 796 808 813 813 813
LTC 500 514 505 493 492 490 489 489
COL 144 157 153 151 152 152 151 151
 
Table 10.   The current AV officer requirements as established by the PMAD.   
For example, of the officers in the ACC, the Army requires 






TIG LT CPT MAJ LTC COL 
1 4294 3850 1584 798 375
2 691 3000 2082 1721 502
3 26 2405 1485 1159 438
4 9 3597 1486 975 372
5 5 2044 1392 781 307
6 0 2090 1507 561 186
7 0 934 491 175 123
8 1 25 250 152 64
9 0 15 173 95 12
10 2 2 91 43 5
 
Table 11.   The TIG of the ACC inventory. 
For example, as of November 2006, there were 4,294 ACC 
LTs with one year TIG, 691 with two years TIG, and 26 
with three years TIG.  
 
TIG LT CPT MAJ LTC COL 
1 271 262 114 45 31
2 58 284 142 106 43
3 2 258 103 68 30
4 6 392 106 54 29
5 2 182 67 61 16
6 0 136 79 41 13
7 0 95 22 19 5
8 1 3 19 13 3
9 0 0 12 15 1
10 1 0 8 4 0
 
Table 12.   The TIG of the AV officer inventory. 
For example, as of November 2006, there were 271 AV LTs 
with one year TIG, 58 with two years TIG, and 2 with three 










TIG LT CPT MAJ LTC COL 
1 0.16% 1.54% 1.13% 1.16% 0.29%
2 0.08% 0.28% 1.53% 1.55% 0.15%
3 6.68% 3.98% 0.10% 0.07% 0.02%
4 0.05% 3.42% 0.16% 0.01% 0.06%
5 0.00% 0.81% 0.66% 0.40% 0.10%
6 0.01% 1.30% 0.17% 0.13% 0.01%
7 0.01% 0.02% 0.18% 0.17% 0.02%
8 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03%
9 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00%
10 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.00%
 
Table 13.   ACC attrition rates used in the TACCOM. 
For example, the attrition rate for CPTs with three years TIG 
is 3.98% for the ACC. 
 
TIG LT CPT MAJ LTC COL 
1 0% 0% 0% 1% 3%
2 4% 0% 0% 4% 1%
3 0% 0% 0% 5% 4%
4 29% 5% 0% 0% 1%
5 21% 50% 0% 10% 1%
6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
8 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
 
Table 14.   AV attrition rates used in the TACCOM. 
For example, the attrition rate for CPTs with five years TIG 
is 50% for the AV branch. 
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